Introduction
During the booms that precede crises in emerging economies, policymakers struggle to limit capital flows and their expansionary consequences. In particular, they attempt to sterilize capital inflows through an open market sale of domestic bonds or increased reserve requirements. These sterilized interventions (henceforth, sterilizations) can be extremely large. During the early 1990s in Chile, for example, the exchange intervention meant that over three quarters of its large capital inflow -amounting to around seven percent of its GDP per year --went to international reserves accumulation at the central bank. The sterilization of this intervention increased the ratio of international reserves to monetary base from 3.5 around 1990 to over 6.0 by 1993. This pattern was repeated in many emerging economies during the early 1990's, when capital flows to the developing world surged. 1 Despite the fact that sterilization is the most common policy response to capital inflows, there is widespread recognition that it is not free of complications. The concerns range from its ineffectiveness to an outright backfiring, where the policy may actually fuel capital inflows, especially short term ones, and lead to an expansion rather than the desired contraction in aggregate demand.
The widespread and nearly automatic explanation for these outcomes follows the MundellFleming (MF) logic, with reference to a scenario where the authority has some exchange rate target and there is extensive capital mobility. Our starting point in this paper is to point out that this explanation is flawed, and that an alternative framework is needed to understand ineffectiveness and its extreme form, backfiring.
In the textbook Mundell-Fleming (MF) framework (Mundell 1962) , the effectiveness of sterilization depends on exchange rate systems and the degree of integration to international financial markets, with the worst case for sterilization being that in which the exchange rate is fixed and the country has full access to international financial markets. In this case, the sterilization is fully undone by the private sector as capital inflows exactly offset There are three central ingredients behind our analysis and results: a) a significant probability of an external crisis in the near future; b) illiquid or underdeveloped domestic financial markets; and c) the sterilization removes domestic liquidity to potentially distressed firms, as is the case when the instruments used in the sterilization are not fully liquid.
The first ingredient implies that there are times when the uncovered interest parity condition does not hold, while the second one says that during these times distressed firms may be unable to fully pledge the value of their projects to potential financiers (those with some access to international markets). In this context, the expected return on domestic loans during crises -or (henceforth) the dollar cost-of-capital for domestic firms -lies above the international interest rate but below the marginal product of investment.
Thus cost-of-capital during crises is determined by the relative availability of domestic liquidity (or collateral) and international liquidity (or collateral 
Crises
We thus define a crisis as an event in which the financing needs of the economy exceed the aggregate external resources available to it. In our simple economy the financing need stems from the ongoing maintenance of the productive structure. The plants of one-half of the firms receive a production shock at date 1 that lowers output per plant from R to r. However, the productivity decline can be offset by reinvesting 6k ( Harberger (1985) and Aizenman (1989) , for alternative models of over-borrowing based on the undervaluation of the country's "monopsony" power in international financial market. 
Substituting (5) into (4) Given this (i.e., that the term in parentheses on the right hand side of (8) on a case where both (12) and (13) 
